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Abstract

Terms of Trade, Commercial Policy,
and the Black Market for Foreign Exchange:
An Empirical Model of Real Exchange Rate Determination

A model of real exchange rate (RER) determination is presented.

The

model permits long run equilibrium movements in RER to be distinguished from
its short run disequilibrium dynamics.

An important aspect of the model is

that it explicitly considers the black market premium as one of the
fundamental determinants of RER.

Especially in economies plagued with

persistent excess aggregate demand, and rapidly depreciating domestic money
under a regime characterized with currency inconvertibility and highly
regulated current account transactions, the black market is usually a
persistent and a growing part of the economy.

The model is then applied to

the case of the Sudan, a less developed country which approximates the
economic environment described above.

Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, Department of Economics, University of Gezira, Wad Madani,
P.O. Box 20, SUDAN.
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1.

Introduction
The concept of real exchange rate (RE~) has assumed a central position in

the past and current debates in the literature on economic development and
growth strategies and the more recent literature on structural adjustment and
economic stabilization.

The RER which is generally defined as the relative

price of tradables to nontradables is taken to be the most important relative
price signalling for intersectoral growth in the long run.

The relevence of

RER to export promotion and generation of optimal output and employment path
can easily be shown in rigorous behavioral models of utility and expenditure
function, example of such literature includes:

Edwards (1986a, 1987b),

Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1986a, 1987), Mussa (1974, 1978), and Pinto (1988)

.
a f ew. 1
to mention

In the context of his insightful work in the area of trade

liberc!.lization and development strategy, Diaz-Alejandro drew from the
experience of Latin America to argue that RER misalignment and especially RER
overvaluation, (with respect to the equilibrium RER), can be detrimental to an
export-oriented development strategy, Diaz-Alejandro (1984).
There is more than one definition for equilibrium RER (ERER).

According

to Edwards (1987a) for example, ERER is the relative price of tradables to
nontradables which, for a given sustainable value of other relevent variables
such as terms of trade, commercial policy, capital and aid flows, and
technology, results in the simultaneous attainment of internal apd external
equilibrium.

A similar view of ERER is taken in the empirical.part of this

paper, where the ERER is consistent with the simultaneous equilibriums in the
asset and home goods markets.

The above two views of ERER emphasize

adjustment in the internal and external sectors as the most immediate issue of
concern.· From the foregoing qiscussion, it is clear that, modelling the
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process of ERER determination is an issue of great concern to both academic
and policy makers alike.

As

This exercise, however, is rather nontrivial.

noted by Edwards (1987a), the ERER is not a fixed immutable number.
experiences two types of movements:

The RER

short run disturbances around its

equilibrium and long run movements between equilibrium points.

The nature of

ERER movement is determined by the path of immediate determinants of the ERER
referred to as the ERER "fundamentals," Domowitz·and Elbadawi (1987b).

Also,

since the notion of equilibrium is "intertemporal" in nature, the path of the
ERER will not only be affected by the current values of the fundamentals, but
also by the expected future evolution of these variables, e.g. Edwards
(1987a).
More recently an important two sector model of tradables and nontradables
due to Dornbusch (1974) has b~en extended by Sjaastad (1980) to a three sector
model of exportables. importables, and home goods; this later model has
subsequently been employed to study RER determination and intersectoral growth
prospects with special emphasis on the agricultural sector.

Authors such as

Valdes (1985, 1986), Mundlak and Cavallo (1987), and Garcia (1981), used the
rather strong evidence generated by the model to argue against RER
overvaluation as a major factor retarding the growth of LDCs' agriculture.
Since agriculture in most LDCs is the main comparative advantage of their
economy, it is argued therefore, that LDCs that adopt policies leading to RER
overvaluation will be pursuing an inoptimal growth path.

The above studies

which drew heavily from Latin American experience has been remarkably matched
by equivalent evidence from Africa and Asia as in the work of Bautista (1985),
Elbadawi (1987), Oyejide (1986), and Tshibaka (1986).
The study of RER determination has traditionally been confined to the
literature on pure trade, hence only.the real determinants of RER such as
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terms of trade and commercial policies were considered.

In the context of the

small country assumption, analytical models of trade theory predicted real
appreciation as a result of TOT improvement or restrictive trade policies, see
for example Balassa (1982), Bacha and Taylor (1977) and Johnson (1966).

More

recent development in RER modelling included more general equilibrium models
that tend to emphasize the importance of intermediate goods and the home
goods' sector to RER determination.

These recent models substantially

qualified the clear-cut predictions of the traditional literature in
international trade and economic liberalization.

The impact on RER of TOT

improvement or higher tariff rates can no longer be signed a priori, even
though an RER appreciation may be more likely than RER depreciation; Edwards
(1987a, 1987b), and Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1987).

In addition to the

long run real determinants of RER, impacts on RER of short run disequilibrium
in the economy and the money market have also been explicitly addressed in
recent models.

The theoretical and empirical examples in this tradition

include: Edwards (1985, 1986b, 1987a), Mundlak and Cavallo (1987), and
Elbadawi (1987).
In this paper we present a model of RER determinantion which accounts for
the long run real determinants of RER as well as the short run disequilibrium
influences on RER.

The main contribution of this paper is that it explicitly

models the impact on RER of the existence of a large black market for foreign
exchange in the economy.

The phenomenon of the black market for foreign

exchange has been typical of many LDCs which are maintaining some forms of
currency inconvertibility, while their domestic currencies were experiencing
rapid depreciation.

In the black market, domestic residents can acquire

foreign exchange at a premium.

Especially in the case of major

labor-exporting countries where it may be difficult to control the supply of
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foreign exchange to the black.market; the latter can be quite large and the
black market dollars may end up being used to fipance current account
transactions.

2

We will show that the black market premium can be a major

source of RER appreciation.

By solving for the premium as a function of the

exogenous variables in the asset market, the model also provides some useful
insight on the dynamic behavior of RER.

In Section (2) of this paper the

model is presented and the issues discussed in this section were developed in
a more rigorous fashion.

In Section (3) this model is applied to the case of

the Sudan which is a major labor-exporting country, with an economy dominated
by the exports of primary agricultural goods and imports of manufactures and

intermediate goods.

In the Sudan taxes on foreign trade is the main source of

government revenue.

The Sudanese economy has also been plagued by an

expanding aggregate excess demand and a rather substantial black market for
foreign exchange.

In Section (4) we will use the econometric analysis of

Section (3) to solve for the estimates of the structural parameters of the
model and then the estimated ERER reduced form equation.

Finally some

concluding remarks follow in Section (5).

2.

The Model
In this section a model of RER determination is developed.

This model

accounts for both the traditional long run real determinants such as the terms
of trade and commercial policy.

The model also incorporates the· short run

disequilibrium effects of excess aggregate demand in the economy.

Another

attractive aspect of this model is that it explicitly considers the impact on
RER when conditions of excess domestic demand for foreign exchange under
currency inconvertibility give rise to the emergence of a black market for
foreign exchange where domestic re£idents can acquire foreign currency at a
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premium rate.
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Also in this model, a discussion of the channels t;hrough which

both the real and monetary factors may impinge on the RER and the extent to
which they are interrelated is provided in some detail.
The model is composed of four major building blocks.

The first is

concerned with the qefinition of RER and the price of tradable goods.

In the

second part of the model we derive a formula for the price of nontradables
when equilibrium in the nontraded goods market is maintained.
semi-reduced form equation for RER can be derived.

At this stage a

This equation will reflect

the influences on RER of the terms of trade, commercial policy, the black
market premium, and the impact of excess aggregate demand in the economy.

In

the last building block of the model we bring the conditions of the money and
the asset markets into the picture.

This will permit an explicit

representation of the black market premium as a function of other exogenous
determiants of RER.

By substituting for the premium in the RER semi-reduced

form equation and also by endogenizing the real income variable, we can
ultimately obtain a full reduced form equation for RER that satisfies
equilibrium in the home goods markets but may also be consistent with a
potential disequilibrium in the asset market.

The RER and the Price of Tradables

(2.1)

Let the (dollar) denominated international prices of exportables and

* respectively.
importables be given by P* and PIll
X

By invoking the small country

assumption, P* and P* can be considered as exogenous variables.
X

m

Therefore for

a given set of exchange rate and commercial policy, PX and Pm , the domestic

*
prices of exportables and.importables will be determined respectively by PX
and P* .
m

Let e and

e be

respectively the official and the black market rates

of exchange where the exchange rate is given in terms of units of domestic
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currency per unit of the foreign currency (dollar).
export tax rate, and t

m

Also let t

X

be the net

be the net tax rate on imports which may also include

non-tariff implicit taxes such as quota rationing.

The domestic prices of

exportables and importables can.then be defined as in equations (1) and (2)
below:

p
X

p

m

e(l-t )P*
X

(1)

X

e {J-1-{J
e
(l+t )P*
m m

0 < fJ < 1

(2)

The presence of the black market rate e in equation (2) reflects the
increasing reliance on the black market dollars to finance some key import
categories in many LDCs.

4

Letting the shares of exportables and importables in the tradable goods'
sector be a and 1-a respectively, the domestic price of tradables, PT, is
simply:

0 < a < 1

(3)

using (1) and (2) on (3) we obtain PT in the.following logarithmic form:

log PT= loge+ (1-a)(l-{J)log q + a log(l-tx)

+ (1-a)log(l+t) + a log P*
m

+ (1-a)log P*
m

X

(4)
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and q = e/e is the black market premium .

Equatio n (4) above shows PT' as

trade policy .
expecte d, to depend on foreign prices , exchan ge rate and foreign
But PT is also shown to depend on q the black market premium .

The extent of

1-a, in
the premium influen ce on PT will depend on the share of import ables;

accoun t link,
the tradab le sector, and on the extent of black market 's curren t

1-p.

Finally , in this block we introdu ce the RER definit ion.

The defini tion

Dornbu sch
which we will use is that of the depend ent econom y type such as in

(1974, 1980) for exampl e.

5

Letting PN stand for the price of nontra dables , we

have:

1-a

p

RER

(2.2)

*
rn

(5)

The Nontra dables' Sector
the
This part of the model draws on the literat ure which origin ated with

sch model
work of Dornbu sch (1974), and Sjaasta d (1980) who extende d the Dornbu
goods or
to three sector s, namely , export ables, import ables, and home
nontra dables .

The demand and supply functio ns for nontrad ables are

represe nted, respec tively, by the followi ng two equatio ns:

p

m

p '
N

and

p

m

p '
N
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where real i.ncome y is used as a proxy for total expenditure in terms of home
goods; f(·) is a measure of excess aggregate demand with f(O) = 0, and f' > O;
and Gp is the productive capacity of the economy presumed to be determined by
The exportables and

the existing domestic resources and technology.
importables' prices. P

X

and P, are taken to be exogenous to the nontraded
m

goods' market because they are determined by government foreign trade and
exchange rate policy, and international market conditions.

Also, the demand

and supply homogeneity properties were exploited to represent the prices in
relative terms.
We now make a simplifying assumption by holding Gp fixed.
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Then we

differentiate the above two equations logarithmically to obtain:

/\

DN

X

A

A

A

€ (P

X

A

A

A

- PN) + €m(Pm - PN) + €y y + €f f(·)

and
A

A

SN

'I

"
(P - PN) +
X X

'I

A
"
- PN)
(P
m m

where the hat(") over a variable denotes a proportionate change; and the €'s
are the demand elasticities for home goods with respect to the exogenous
variables; the 'l's are the corresponding supply elasticities.

While the €'s

are expected to be positive, the 'l's are expected to be negative.

Assuming

static equilibrium in the nontraded goods' market, we have:

We can now obtain the following formula for PN which is the equilibrium
condition in the home goods' market:
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(6)

where

w=
·

(€ -~)

x

x

+

0 < w < 1

(€ -~ )'

m m

w

> 0

w

y

y

> 0

(€ -~) + (€ -~)
x
x
m m

In order to have an explicit measure of excess aggregate demand, we
A

A

A

A

assumed that f is equal to (DC - e - Y) which is the rate of growth in
domestic credit in eicess of real growth in income or output plus the rate of
official devaluation.

This measure of excess aggregate demand emphasizes the

importance of domestic credit expansion in ratifying excess aggregate demand.
The measure also recognizes the sluggishness in real growth as a major factor

in accentuating excess aggregate demand.
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Using the above definition off(·), and equations (1) and (2) in (6) we
obtain the following equation for PN in logarithmic form:

w +loge+ (1-w)(l-fi)log q + w log(l-tx)
0

(7)
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(2.3)

Semi-Reduce d Form Equations for RER
Using equations (5) and (7) above we obtain a reduced form equation for

RER (indexed over time) in equation (8) below:

- wy log y t - wf log[DC]
ey
t

- (1-w)(l-P) log qt

(8)

Now we will assume the following path for real income y similar to the one

proposed by Edwards (1986b):

log yt - g0 + g1t

*

+

g2 log[::]

(9)

m t

Equation (9) assumes that the rate of growth in real income y, is formed of
two components:

a term of trade component and an independent term given by gt

which is set equal to g 1 t for simplicity.
Using (9) in equation (8) above we obtain another semi-reduce d form
equation for RER:
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-w

log(l-tx) t -

*

[(w-a) +

g2(wy-wf)] log[::]
m

t

(10)

Equations (8) and (10) above are semi-reduced form equations because the
potentially endogenizable variables y and q were treated as exogenous in (8),
while q was taken to be exogenous in (10).

Equation (8) is confined to the

first round effects of the determinants of RER.

For example the first round

effects of commercial policy is given by the coefficients of log(l-t) and
X

log(I+t ).
.

m

According to equation (8) a decrease in export or import taxes

will cause an RER depreciation.

The extent of such depreciation will depend

on the respective relative elasticities, w, and 1-w, of the price of
exportables and importables in the home goods market.

This clear cut result

is generated by our model because we assumed that the substitution effects
between tradables and nontradables (wand 1-w) dominate any potential income
effect due to commercial policy.

Especially for the case of importables, it

is argued that if initially there was a large tariff in place, the reduction
in tariffs may increase welfare and the demand for nontradables, thus leading
to an upward pressure in their prices, Edwards (1987b).

Should this income

effect dominate, we may have an RER appreciation rather than depreciation as a
result of tariff liberalization; contrary to what is predicted by our model.
The model, however, can easily be extended to accommodate for this channel by
adding the term log(l+t) to the right hand side of equation (9) above.
m

Equation (8) also depicts the first round effects on RER due to
expenditure, aggregate excess demand and the premium.

An increase in
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expenditure or in aggregate excess demand will cause the price of nontradables
(equation (7)) to rise, thus leading to an RER appreciation.

The extent of

this appreciation is given by the respective elasticities wy and wf.

A rise

in the black market premium is also predicted to cause an RER appreciation.
The extent of the premium effect will depend, however, on both_the elasticity
due to the price of importables in home goods market (1-w), as well as the
share of imports financed through the black market, 1-p.
Finally for the case of terms of trade, equation (8) predicts that a TOT
improvement cannot cause an RER appreciation, as predicted by the classical
theory of real trade; only if the exportables price elasticity, w, exceeds the
share of exportables in the tradable goods group can an RER appreciation take
place.

This implies that the effect on RER due to TOT is not a priori

determined even when we confine ourselves to the first round effects as in
equation (8) above.

The picture for the TOT effects will be even more

ambiguous in the context of equation (10) when the second round effects were
brought into the picture.
opposing channels.

Tqese TOT second round effects were provided by two

A TOT improvement will lead through (9) to an increase ~n

real income and a consequent rise in PN (equation (7)) thus leading to an RER
appreciation of magnitude g wy; a rise in real income (output) on the other
2
hand, will lead to a declining aggregate excess demand, causing a decline in
PN and ultimately an RER depreciation of magnitude, g wf.
2

This aspect of the

model is quite attractive since it accommodates the recent theoretical results

in the literature of RER determination, Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1986a).

2.4

The Monetary and Asset Markets
This block of the model is built around the following set of equations:

13

(11)

(12)

log[~Rl
eFJt

a

0

(13)

-

(14a)
and
(14b)

Equation (11) is the money supply identity, where Mis the stock of money, DC
is domestic credit, and R is the official foreign reserves which is
denominated in the foreign currency.

Equation (12) depicts the domestic

currency denominated stock of official reserve relative to the domestic value

of private holdings of foreign money, as a function of the foreign TOT and the
equilibriwn conditions in the asset market.

The potential positive impact on

reserves as a result of TOT improvement is obvious.

The inclusion of the

other term in equation (12) provides a direct link between the asset market
and the foreign balance.

Subsequently this will generate very interesting

channels in the ultimate RER reduced form equation.

This idea was used by

Edwards (1985, 1987a) where the equilibrium condition in the money market was
introduced in a similar fashion.

In our case, however, where the black market

for foreign exchange is an important phenomenon, and the choice between the
two currencies is important, the asset market equilibrium condition is more
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relevent.

Equation (13) describes the demand for domestic money relative to

foreign money.

the effect of real income is expected to be positive; while

"e
the effect of e , the opportunity cost of holding domestic money relative to
the foreign money, is expected to be negative.

The opportunity cost of

holding domestic money is given by the expected rate of depreciation of the
black market rate, and expectations are assumed to be rational as in (14a)
above.

Expectations of official devaluation is also assumed to be rational as

in (14b).
From equations (14a) and (14b) it follows that:

"e
et= Et log qt+l - log qt+ Et

(15)

From equations (11)-(13) we can derive the following equation for relative
money supply:

l
r

M
Oz (1-m)ao
m
log-~
= l+O_(l-m) + 1+0 0 (1-m,)
le.rJ t
z·
·
""

0 (1-m)
1
+ 1+8 (1-m)
2
+

*

log[::]
mt

o2 (1-m)a 2

1 + 0 (1-m) log yt
2
0 (1-m)a
"e
2
1
1 + 8 (1-m) et
2

which we will simply write in the following unconstrained form:
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log[-M]
eF

(2.5)

(16)
t

The RER Reduced Form and the Working of the Model
Using equations (9) and (15) on (16) above we can obtain the following

martingale structure:

(17)

h

-70 - 73go
m - 71
=-----+----t
1 + 74 - 71
1 + 74 - 71

*
log [)]

mt

(18)
or

(19)

Using the method of undetermined coefficients a particular forward solution of
8

the above problem is obtained as follows :
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CX)

I

(20)

j=0

In the event that asset market equilibrium is imposed or the impact of asset
market disequilibrium on reserves is deemed to be insignificant, the following
represent?-tion for the premium will be obtained.:

CX)

I

j=0

(21)

Equation (21) describes the rational expectation equilibrium in the asset
market, while equation (20) is consistent with disequilibrium in the asset
market.

Both of the two equations are important equations in their own right

in the context of the asset market approach to the black market for foreign
More importantly to our

T--."Y"nr-n~+_p.1..1....-,oV.L.l\..-

...,,.......-,,1 ... .,.,..;,..

C.U. .lCI..LJ.::,.L;;:,'

...,_.,..,.

0.11Y

of the above two equations permits in a natural way, the incorporation of the
dynamic aspects of RER determination.

By using (19) and (20) in (10) we

obtain the ultimate dynamic reduced form RER.equation in (22) below.

Should

we use (21) instead of (20), the solution will be a special case of (22) where
the resulting RER solution will be consistent with equilibriums in both the
asset and home goods' markets.
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log[i]

(22)
t+j

Besides showing the current impacts on RER of its exogenous determinants as in
equation (10) above; equation (22) which satisfies equilibrium in the
nontraded goods market, also.includes the impact on RER of the expected
behavior of its determinants.

The channel through which expectation about the

exogenous variables impinges on RER is the black market premium.
on RER of a given Eh

The impact

. will therefore depend crucially on the size of the

t t+J

black market, 1-~; and the extent of the imported goods' intensity of the home
goods, 1-w.

The magnitude of the innovation Eh

. itself will depend of

t t+J

course on the relative changes among the exogenous variables as well as the
elasticities pertaining to the asset market, the foreign reserve equation, and
the money market identity.
three determinants.

Etht+j will lead to an RER appreciation through

The first is given through an expectation of higher level

of domestic credit relative to the private holding of foreign money
denominated in domestic currency using the official exchange rate,

18

log[n~]
; this clearly shows the importance of unchecked domestic credit
e t+j
expansion in accentuating RER appreciation.

Thus, besides its current impact

on RER through the aggregate excess demand, the current and expected levels of
DC may also cause further RER appreciation through the ~remiurn channel.

The

second effect that may cause an RER appreciation is the expected level of
official reserves relative to the private holding of foreign money,
Etlog[;)

. In cases when the economy is characterized by a structurally
t+j .

weak currency and a relatively large black market for foreign exchange, R may
in fact be very small relative to F.

The impact of Etlog[_i_j

on RER
t+j

therefore, may, in fact, ameliorate the appreci.ationary effect due to domestic
credit expansion.

Finally, expectations of accelerated rates of official

devaluation will also cause RER appreciation.

This result has very important

implications for the debate related to the effectiveness of nominal exchange
rate devaluation as a tool of economic stabilization and export promotion,
when the economic environment is dominated by speculative behavior and
expectations.

The final term in Etht+j of interest to our discussion is

*
Etlog[:~]-

An expected improvement in the terms of trade will unambiguously

lead to an RER depreciation.

Within the black market channel, the expected

TOT will operate through two further sub-channels.

The first is the effect of

income in the demand for money and the other is the direct effect of TOT on
foreign reserves.
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3.

'
An Application to the Sudan

(3.1)

The Sudan's RER and Its Determinants:

A Preliminary Analysis

In this section we will apply the above model to analyze the determinants
of the Sudanese RER.

The Sudan economy provides an interesting case study to

discuss the type of issues considered jn the model of Section (2).

The

mainstay of the Sudan economy is provtded by its agricultural sector which
provides for more than 90% of total foreign exchange earnings out of exports.
The domestic industry and a significant portion of the agricultural sector, on
the other hand, depend heavily on imported capital and intermediate goods.
Despite an increasing share for the nontradable service sector in the GDP, the
Sudanese economy remains highly tradable with the combined share of
agriculture and industry in GDP in excess of 50%.
alternative definitions of the Sudan RER.

Figure (1) depicts two

Another view of the Sudan's RER and

its potential determinants is provided by Table (1) and (2).

One such

determinant is TOT which has been averaging more than 90% except for the years
1975 and 1979 which came immediately ater two major oil price hikes.

The

Sudan's economy has also been characterized by an extensive system of import
restrictions and fixed multiple exchange rates.

This type of regime which is

generally considered typical of most LDCs, is presumed to have its
intellectual motivation in a development doctrine bent on "Industrial Import
Substitution" as the main strategy.

In the case of the Sudan, however, other

goals such as balance of payment, and government revenue considerations,
encouragement of remittances from Sudanese nationals working abroad (SNWA)

9

and to some extent export promotion,·. seem to be the key factors shaping the
Sudan's foreign trade and payment regime, Elbadawi (1987).

As the Sudanese

economy started to assume crisis proportions by the mid seventies and the
domestic and foreign balances continued to worsen, the need to check excess
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aggreg ate demand and to mainta in governm ent revenue s ensure s the
mainten ance
of the above system.

The attemp ted foreign trade libera lizatio n that came

with an IMF-in spired packag e could not, therefo re, be sustain ed.

The figures

on Table (1) attest to the above descrip tion.
Also, as can be seen from Table t2), the turbula nt develop ments in
the
Sudane se macroec onomic science after the mid sevent ies have include
d massiv e
moneta ry expans ion with the money supply (M ) and domest ic credit
growin g,
1
respec tively, at an average annual rate of 27%, and 26% during 1975-1
986. The
offici al reserve s which have been stagna nt or at times growing at
a negativ e
rate has only partia lly modera ted the overal l growth rate in the
money supply ,
see Table (2).

The combin ation of moneta ry expans ion and highly anticip ated

maxi-d evalua tions has accele rated domest ic inflati on which rose from
a single
10
digit by 1972/73 to more than 37% by 1985.
Such conditi ons of inflati onary
environ ment and highly suppre ssed aggreg ate demand, especi ally the
one for
import ed goods, have paved the way for the emergen ce and subseq uent
expans ion
of the black market for foreign exchan ge.

In recogn ition of the increas ing

importa nce of SNWA remitta nces as a source of much needed foreign
exchan ge,
the author ities have introdu ced a premium exchang e rate for SNWA
remitta nces
and a new import system, the 'nil-va lue' system .

These two measur es were

designe d to encoura ge the transfe r of remitta nces through the regula
r banking
system and the use of SNWA savings to finance imports to the country
.

The

offica l exchang e rate, howeve r, could not keep pace with the black
market
rate, see Table (l); and therefo re the lion share of SNWA remitta
nces were
channe led through the black market .

On the other hand, the 'nil-va lue' system

of import s - being largely finance d by black market dollars - were
turned into
a curren t accoun t link for the black market .

For example by 1980 about 60% of

total imports were finance d through the black market , Hussain (1986).

Due to

Figure ( 1)
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Table 1
The Sudan's Real Exchange Rates and· Its Determinants

Black Market
_l.1L

Premium

'r'ear

REER

RERUS

TOT

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
i978
1979

76.2
81.9
75. 1
78.3
88.9
74.3

108.4
107.7
103.6
152.8
139.4
94.8
96. 1
82.2

98.0
85.3
87.3

74.7

~- -

• 098

O..), ,2'1

.094

. 649

1.333
1.833
2.233

1980

100.0
92.2
100. 1
104.7
79.8
86.6
72.1

82.8
100. 0

77.5
100.0
88.2
98.0
94. 1

.074
• 105

.59B
.521
.551

2.286
1.740
1.862

.066

.218

• 012
.028
.013

.219
.621

1.800
1. 616
1. 877

.679
.680

2.579
2.381

1981
1982
1983

1984
1985
1986

76.3

74.8
70.6

70.B

86.3

84.5
102.8
83.4
72.8
59.7

83.3

89.2
69.6
89.2
98.0

93.4

96.9

--1.L
.052
.057

.059
. 057
.066
.095
.089

• 172

.658
.663
,627
.530

.564
.443

.515
.815

1 • 200
1.200
1. 200
1.200
1. 200
1.20(1

Note: The real effective exchange rate CREER) was cbmputed as: a weighted sum
of the exchange rates multipiied by WPI's for Sudan's major trading partners,
divided by the Sudan's CPI. fhe CPI, the only price series available for the
Sudan, is used as a proxy for the price of nontradables, see Elbadawi (i987) for
Egypt (.03); Saudi Arabia
The partner£:. \and weights) are:
(.11), France (.06),
Germany
West
i.06)
USA
(.32),
East
and rest of the Middle
1

discussion on this.

UK (.12). Italy (.10), In'dia (.1)6), Japan (.09), Romania (0.0ll, Yugosl.avia
1.04). The RERUS index is obtained by multiplying the bilateral Sudan-US
exchange rate with the World Price Index for Manufactures and dividing by the
Sudanese CPI. An increase in any of the two RER indices reflects real
depreciation wherea5 a d2crPase in RER is appreciation. The black market
premium is obtained as a ratio of the black market rate to the official rate.
Sources:

The data on prices, exchange rates and taxes are obtained from IFS
and El badawi ! 1987).

Table (2)
Rates of Change in Some of Sudan's Key Macroeconomic Indicators (X)

Year

Money
Supply
( M1)

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

Sources:

6.8
15.4
19.6
30.1
17. 1
21. 9
35,(1
24.3
27.8
27. 1

-- .,)~

..:.,

31.2
11. 1
16.8
40.5
36. 1

Official
Reserves
($)

25, 1
24. 1
54.6
70.7
-122.8
-43.3

-2. 1
20.6
86.4
-32.5
-105.2
18.7
-21.1
~'. 0

-34.3
156.8

Domestic
Credit
1:,. 6
18. 1
11. 1
26. 1
46. 1
24.8
27.5
21.5
20.5
19.6
29,6
14.9
25.8
17.B
31.1
31.6

INF
CC~CP I)

1.2
7.9
14.6
21.6
19. 1

2.0
16. 1
18.2
29.0
24.2
12.4
31.9
27.6
26.8
22.2
r:;
- C'
iJ. iJ
..)

Real

GDP

Deipreciatio n in
the Black
Real Depreciatio n
Market
Official
RERUS
REER
R~.te
Devaluation

.,.

...,. C',_,

00.0

00.0

9.6

00.0
00. 0

00.0
00. 0
00.0
00.0

3.0

11. 3
0,2
18.2
7.5
2.5
-16.7
-5.9
5.9
6 'J

00.0

• .L.

14.8
32.2

. ) • 0'

40 .. 5

-

-7.9
-1. 7
4. 1

oo.o

00.0

oo.o

00. 0

15.4
-c.) ;,;i

•

-I

8.0
37.9
10.0

10.5
31.8
19.7
17.7
8.4
21.6
28. B·
29.8
22.9
69.7
2.0

7. 1
8.6
4. 1
12.7
-18.0
2.6
-2.0
-5.8
0.3

34;5
-8. 1

8.3

4.4
-27.1
8. 1
-18.2

-0.6
-3.9
38.9
-9.2
-38.5
1.3
-15.5
-9.6
10.3
18.9
-14.7
-2. 1
19.6
-20.9
-13.6
-19.8

IFS, Bank of Sudan, and World Currency Year Book, (various issues).
I\.)

w
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the existence of such a large black market for foreign exchange, the black
market premium can be a major factor causing RE& appreciation.

(3.2)

The Econometric Model
In this sub-section we will conduct an econometric analysis of RER in the

Sudan based on the model of Section (2) above.

Sufficies to estimate

equations (9), (10), (12), (13), and (16) in order to identify the structural
parameters of the model.

Variants of the above equations were estimated using

annual Sudanese data for the period 1970-1987.

The regressions' results are

reported in the following equations:

*

,.,
log yt = -.01 TREND+ .46
(.005)
(.17)

+ 1. 25 log[p:]
(.0 9 )
pm t-1

*
+ 0.56 [log yt-l - log[p:]
]
(.l 6 )
pm t-1
·

0. 52 · , DW

,.,
log RERt

4.51 + 0.01
(.007)

1.54

TREND

, Q(7) = 6.96

-0.91

(.14)

1:,.

log[~c]t

1-tx]
- 1. 35 log(l+t)
- 1.25 log _ _
l+t
[
m t
( .43)
( .42)
Ill t

(9')

25

*
log[P:]
(. 20)

+ 0 .13

+ 0 .18
(.04)

P
m t

2

R = 0.94,

[log RERt-l - log[~c] t-1 - log qt-ll
(10')

DW = 2.19, Q(7) = 10.99

"

"
- .87

+(0.116)
0.098 [log[~d] - log[~eF] ]
eF
t

t

(P*
__)

+ 0.31

t:.

+ 1.15
(. 79 )

(0.50

O. 94 [log[ ~R]

+

(.ll)

2

R

eF t-1

loglPmt-1
:J

- log[p;] ]
pm t-1

(12')

= 0.96 , DW = 2.03 , Q(7) = 6.83

"

log[~e F]
1

-1.96
(.620)

=

t

[loge t+ l - logetl + 0.23
logyt - 0.43
(.023
(.25)

2
R = 0.46 , DW = 1.83 , Q(7)

3.08

(13')

"

0.84 t:.
(.056)

+

log[~cJ
eF

0.
57 [1 o g [~eF]
(.24)

D

*

+O. 75

t

l
t-

(.11)

.06 log[P:]
log[~cJ +(.034)
eF t-l
mt-

_log[~cJ
· eF t-1]

P

l
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2

R

- 0.98 , DW

~

2.5 , Q(7)

~

8.6

(16')

The estimation technique used is OLS and standard errors are in
parantheses.

Q(7) is the Box-Pierce statistics for residual autocorrelation

to 7th order.

The RER variable used in the econometric model is the REER as

defined in the footnote of Table (1).

Dis a dummy variable for the post 1984

drought period which witnessed an even higher accelerated monetary expansion.
The data on eF, the domestic currency denominated value of foreign currency
held by the private sector, is proxied by the estimate of the income
circulated in the black market.

11

defined as in Section (2) above.

Other variables in the above equations are
The above regression results may of course

be subject to criticism perhaps due to the relatively shor't range of the
estimation, or the not so high quality of the Sudanese data on eF and y, see
the data appendix for more details on this.

Not withstanding the above

criticism, no evidence of serious misspecification, however, can be detected.
Also virtually all the elasticity estimates are statistically significant, and
all of them are consistent with the theoretical model.
The variables involved in the above cited equations were found to be
·
·
co-integrating;

12

.
th"
i s suggests t h e use o f an error-correction
mo d e 1 to

.
.
13
estimate
t h e equations.

Our error-correc~ion estimating equations are

consistent with a one period error-correction loss function similar to the one
employed in Domowitz and Elbadawi (1987), and Elbadawi (1984). 14

The error

correction, besides being a generalization to the partial adjustment type
models, is advantageous in at least two counts.

It provides a more general

lag structure that does not impose too specific a shape on the model, Hendry
(1980a).

It also avoids the fundamental 'spurious' regression problem of

Granger and Newbold (1974).
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Equati on (10') is the hallma rk of the above system .

It provid es the
The

inants of RER.
elasti city estima tes of the first and second order determ
excess aggreg ate
equati on reveal s strong eviden ce on the impact on RER of

un impac t
demand , log[~c J, with short run elasti city at -0.91 and long-r
elasti city at -0.18.

While the premiu m, log q, does not have an impac t in the

city.
short- run, it does have a signif icant long-r un impact elasti

There fore,

and the black
as expec ted for the Sudane se econom y, excess aggreg ate demand
As we

appre ciatio n.
marke t premiu m can be major source s of real exchan ge rate

determ inant depend s
mentio ned in Sectio n (2), the impact on RER of the later
size of the black
crucia lly on the import intens ity of the home goods and the
above.
marke t, which are both quite substa ntial, see Sectio n (3.1)

The above

rcial policy .
equati on also shows signif icant influe nce on RER for comme

The

ed subje ct to the
elasti city estima tes due to comme rcial policy were obtain
param eteric restri ctions of equati on (10).

The elasti city due to expor t

s and other
taxes, log (1-tx) is given b! -1.25, while that due to tariff
is given by -0.10.
impli cit import taxes, log(l +t)
m

To the exten t that this

for the future
resul t is robust , this findin g has very impor tant implic ations
the Sudan.
direct ion of foreig n trade and public financ e polici es in

It is

it should sustai n net
clear that Sudane se export s canno t remain compe titive if
foreig n trade taxes.

Impor t taxes on the other hand, were shown to be a less

that the cost in
impor tant factor in causin g RER appre ciatio n; thus sugge sting
of taxing impor ts,
terms of export compe titiven ess may not be high as a result
espec ially final consum er goods.

The positi ve impact on RER of the trend

aggreg ate demand
factor shows that the influe nce of income throug h the excess
el.
chann el domin ates its influe nce throug h the expen diture chann

Finall y the

ement will improv e
impac t on RER due to TOT is also positi ve, thus a TOT improv
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the competitiveness of the economy.

The effect due to TOT which encompasses

the income, excess demand, and direct channels is not found to be
statistically significant, however.

The structural parameters of equation

(10) of Section (2) above are consistent with long run equilibrium in the
nontradable sector, .the estimates of these parameters are obtained from (10)
by setting~ log xt = 0, and log x t- ·= log x t for any variable x and then
1
solving for log RERt to obtain:

A

log RER = 5.5 + 0.01 TREND - 1.52 log(l-t)
X

-.12 log(l+t)
Ill

+
._

t

(10")

Note that the presence of the term log

rleDClJ in equation
-

(10") implies that

-

aggregate excess demand in the economy is allowed to persist in the long-run.
Secondly, we consider equation (9') which shows the TOT as having a
significant impact on real income both in the short run and the long run with
impact elasticity given by 0.46 and 1.25 respectively, the error correction
term effect is also quite significant at 0.56.

Real income in Sudan is also

shown, as expected, to experience a declining trend with an annual percentage
decline of 1%.

The long run equilibrium equation consistent with (9') is

..

[p:1

obtained analogously by setting~ log p~t = 0,
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logy

and solving for logy

t- 1 '

to obtain:
t

*

A

(9")

- - .02 TREND + 1.57 log[:~ t

Equation (12') als.o shows an important role for TOT as a determinant of
official reserves accumulation relative to private holding of foreign money.
This result is fairly consistent with the stylized facts of the Sudanese
economy being highly dependent on the exports of primary agricultural goods
and the imports of intermediate and manufactured goods.

The equation,

however, shows a rather insignificant impact for disequilibrium in the asset
market.

One explanation for this result is that the use of annual data in the

estimation may have caused the model to fail to pick the essentially short run
effect of the asset market disequilibrium.

Another explanation is that the

asset market may in fact be in equilibrium since the black market premium can
move freely to ensure that.
The e~pl

~n,qt-i nnc:

of the above res1..1lt be as they may be, based on the

findings of equation (12') we impose a zero coefficient for the term due to
the disequilibrium in the asset market and we therefore rewrite equation (12)
of Section (2) as:

Substituting the above equation in the monetary identity (11) of Section (2)
we obtain a money supply equation which is equivalent to equation (16) of
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Section (2) when equilibrium in the asset market is imposed.

The

correspondi ng regression estimates are provided in (16').
The implication s of the above are that the resulting long run black
market premium will be consistent with equilibrium in the asset market as in
equation (21) of the model, also the ultimate RER solution will be consistent
with equilibrium s in both of the asset and home goods markets.

In equation

(16') above, the supply of domestic money relative to foreign money is shown
to be accounted for by domestic credit expansion and TOT.

While both of the

two factors ha~e significant long-run impacts on relative money supplies, only
domestic credit has a significant short run effect.

Also, as expected, the

direct impacts on!:!_ due to domestic credit expansion is much higher than the

eF

indirect effects of TOT channeled through the official reserves.

The equation

analogous to (16') describing the equilibrium determinant s of the relative
money supply is given in (16") below.

A

0.42

log.[;;L

+ 0.13

log

(16")

Finally we consider the relative demand for money equation, which is the
only equation in the system estimated directly, see footnote (13).

The

estimates of the equation which are reported in (13') reflect a·strong
influence on relative money demand due to exchange rate expectation s; the
impact due to real income is also statistical ly significant albeit much
smaller in absolute value.
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4.

The Equilibrium Premium and Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate in the Sudan
By equating the right hand sides -of equations (13') and (16") of the

* which is
above section we can solve for the black market premium, log qt,
consistent with equilibrium in the asset market.

* is
The formula for log qt
"*

provided in equatio~ (21) of Section (2), and its estimate log qt is given in
equation (21') below:

00

(1. 96 + .42) -l

I

(

1.%

ll.96+.42
j=O

]j

Eh

t t+j

(21')

and

+ 1.96

log[e1:

1

) - (0.23)(-.02)TREND

Equation (21') above provides a very useful insight of the equilibrium

has been consistently in excess of one despite repeated official exchange rate
devaluations.

As can be seen from the expression of h above, credit expansion

and expectation of future devaluation are key factors behind the observed
behavior of the premium.
channels:

The effect of TOT on the premium works through two

the one through reserves is given by 0 (1-m) = (.22)(.58) which has
1

a positive effect on log q * , the other has a negative effect on log q* and
works through the income channel in the relative demand for money and is given
by: ( . 2 3) ( 1. 57) .

The net·effect on log q* is -.23 which tends to ameliorate

the positive effects on q due to domestic credit expansion and speculative
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environment.

This TOT counter effect is relatively small being of only second

order as compared to the other two first order; this finding, however, which
reflects the importance of external factors may have important qualitative
implications for domestic stabilization policy, see Elbadawi (1988d).

Finally

the effect due to TREND which can be construed as.aproxy for technological
progress or growth in real output (or income) due to non-price factors.

Since

the real growth in output has been small and negative in the Sudan, the
effectof TREND on log q * is small yet positive.

Once again this result

demonstrates the potential payoffs in terms of economic stabilization that can
be generated from investment in aggregate output supply.
of Eh . on log q*t will be discounted by (.42)(.82)j.
t t+J
time series structures for the elements of h

The ultimate impact
If we assume specific

. we can obtain the full effect
t+J

* we do this by assuming the following time series
of Eh . on log qt'
t t+J
processes:

(21.1')

log F t+j

log F

. l +
t+J-

E

2 ,t+J.

log DCt+j = log DC . l + µ +
t+J - '

(21.2')

E

3, t+j

(21.3')·

*

log[::] -log[:~* .
m t+j

+

f

4, t+j

(21.4')

t+j-1

where the e's are white noise disturbances.

Equation (21.2') and (21.4')

state that each of TOT and stock of foreign money held by domestic residents
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follows a random walk.

According to equations (21.1') and (21.3') on the

other hand, the official exchange rate is expected to experience a constant
devaluatio~ rate¢, while the expected gro'wth rate in domestic credit isµ.
Now using (21.1') - (21.4') on (21') we obtain the. following operational

"*
equation for log qt:

+ 17.11 ¢ + 0.01 TREND+ 0.05

(21")

Finally we use equation (21") in the semi reduced form equation for log RER
given in (10") above to obtain the estimate of log RERt* the equilibrium RER
(ERER).

The results are provided in Table (3) below:

t
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Table (3)
The Determinants of ERER in the Sudan

Channel
Direct Income Excess A~gregate Demand Black Market Total
Determinant

0.12

log(l-t)

-1. 52

log(l+t)

- .12

X

m

-1.52

-.12

-.22

log Ft

TREND

(1)

.28(.12)( 2 )

0.01

-.22

- .44

+.22

+.22

-1.03

-1.03

-3.76

-3.76

-.002

.098

Due to income, excess aggregate demand as well as the direct influence
on tradables and nontradables.

(2) Since the direct effect due to TOT is not statistically significant, we
might as well consider only TOT effect through the black market.
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The results of Table (3) confirm our view that:

in the Sudan the black

market for foreign exchange can be a major channel of real exchange rate
appreciatio n.

Through the black market, the dollar denominated stock of

domestic credit,

[~ct,

has a strong appreciatio nary effect on RER with an

elasticity equal to -.22; [~C)t also exerts another effect on RER of the same
order of magnitude through the direct channel ·of excess aggregate demand.

The

total effect of the initial or current stock of domestic credit [~C)t is
therefore given by an elasticity of -.44.

The other major cause of RER

appreciatio n channeled through the black market is the r~te of growth of
domestic credit, µ, with an elasticity of -1.03.

In addition to the above

causes of RER appreciatio n which were channeled through the black market,
expectation of future devaluation s stands to be recognized as the most
important with an elasticity of -3.76.

These factors and especially the last

one, can explain a lot about the observed ineffective ness of official nominal
devaluation in bringing about reasonable levels of RER depreciatio n.

Betweeen

1979 which marked the beginning of the major maxi-devalu ations in the Sudan
and 1987 the year of the last devaluation ; the average annual rate of

devaluation was 26% while the RER depreciated .at a meager annual rate of 4%.
Still operating through the black market channel, a decrease in F, the stock
of foreign money privately held; will cause an RER appreci~tio n with an
elasticity of O. 22.
the Sudan.

This finding has very important policy impU.cation s for

The recent trade policies in the Sudan aimed at utilizing black

market dollars to finance imports, can be quite costly in terms of
competitive ness of the economy.

Such policy will first lead to enhancing the

importance of the black market channel by increasing the factor, 1-fi, which is
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the share of imports financed through the black market.

This policy will also

upset the asset market equilibrium by reducing the stock, F, thus leading to
RER appreciation.
The other determinants of RER have already been discussed in the previous
section, hence a summary statement is in order.

The effect on RER due to

commercial policy is consistent with prior expectation in that foreign trade
taxes on exports or imports can lead to RER ap_pr·eciation.

The impact due to

export taxes, however, is much stronger than that of import taxes.

TOT

improvement on the other hand, is shown to cause RER depreciation.

This

implies that just like domestic policy mistakes, adverse external factors can
lead to deteriorating competitiveness in the Sudanese economy as well.

And

finally, if we identify the trend effect; though minimal, with productivity
growth, the investment in output supply is shown to lead to enhanced
competitiveness in the economy; this is of course a fairly classical result.

5.

Concluding Remarks
The real exchange rate is increasingly recognized as the main policy

variable in the academic and policy discussions in a wide range of issues such
as indebtedness, stabilization, growth, food security and the role of
agriculture in LDCs.

RER misalignment, and .especially overvaluation with

respect to its equilibrium, is presumed to be a major impediment to achieving
the above policy goals which are the hallmark of any potential economic
achievement of a developing country.

As such, therefore, modelling of RER

behavior is a top priority in the research agenda from both the academic and
policy oriented perspectives.

Especially emphasized in this connection is the

ability to develop models that permit distinction between the long run
equilibrium behavior of RER and its short run disequilibrium dynamics.
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In this paper I presented a model that addresses the above concerns.

The

model permits long run equilibrium movements in -RER to be distinguished from
the short run disequilibrium movements of the RER.

An important aspect of the

model is that it explicitly considers the black market premium as one of the
fundamental determinants of RER.

Especially in economies plagued with

persistent excess aggregate demand, and rapidly depreciating domestic money
under a regime characterized with currency inconvertibility and highly
regulated current account transactions, the black market is usually a
persistent and a growing part of the economy.

The rational expectation

solution of the equilibrium black market premium which reflects the
equilibrium in the asset market allows for dynamic determinants of RER to be
incorporated naturally in the ultimate ERER representation.

This model is

then applied to the case of the Sudan, an LDC which approximates the economic
environment described above.
The findings confirm other evidence on the impact on RER of commercial
policy.

It is found that dependence on foreign trade taxes as the main source

of government revenue may be costly in terms of the competitiveness of the
Sudanese economy.

The evidence, however, is much stronger for the case of

export taxes than for import taxes.

The TOT effect is such that a worsening

in the TOT will lead to an RER appreciation rather than depreciation.

This

result is consistent with the structure of the Sudanese economy where the
prime comparative advantage is provided by the export-oriented agricultural
sector, especially the traditional subsector with its low intensity of
imported inputs.

The evidence also reflects an important effect on RER of

domestic monetary expansion, it can cause both short-run and long-run RER
appreciation.

Domestic credit growth operates on RER through two channels:

a

direct one through the excess,.aggregate demand and the indirect channel of the
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The premium is an important channel which in addition

black market premium.

to the above determina nt also allows expectati ons about future devaluati on to
impinge quite significa ntly on RERE in the Sudan.

Expectati on of future

devaluati on is shown to be a major factor causing RER appreciat ion.

This

finding can at least partially explain·t he observed empirical regularit y
regarding the ineffectiv eness of official devaluati ons in influenci ng real
variables in a positive way in highly speculati ve environme nts such as the one
in the Sudan.

Finally the evidence also showed that a reduction in the stock

of foreign currency privately held will lead to an RER appreciat ion.

One

implicati on of this finding is that any policy that leads to an enhanced
current account role for the black market such as the 'nil' value system of
imports in the Sudan,

16

can be presumed to have deleterio us effects on the

competiti veness of the economy.
In LDCs there is in general no distincti on between monetary and fiscal
policy.

Strictly speaking, domestic credit expansion is basically determine d

by the fiscal deficit.

This paper, however, did not consider such dependenc y.

Endogeniz ing domestic credit, therefore , is an interestin g extension to this
work in the future.
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DATA APPENDIX
A.l

Foreign Trade Taxes
Data on import and export taxes were obtained from Elbadawi (1987).

The

export tax rate was calculated as a weighted average of the individual tax
rates for six of Sudan's major agricultural exports.

The import tax on the

other hand, accounts for the implicit effect due to QRs in addition to the
average tariff rate, see Elbadawi (1987) for more detail.

A.2

Exchange Rates and Prices
Data on exchange rates and prices for the Sudan and its trading partners

are obtained from the IFS.

The price data for the Sudan is the CPI, the only

price available for the entire period.
partners are WPis.

The prices of the Sudan's trading

The black market exchange rate data on the Sudan is

obtained from Elbadawi (1987), and World Currency Yearbook.

A.3

Income
The income variable used in this study is the Sudanese GDP series, which

is based on the national -income accounts.
with such series.

There are some well known problems

Such problems are due to changes in methodology used to

assemble the accounting data, and to potentially large errors in the survey
data.

Nevertheless, these are the best income data available at this time,

and are obtained from line 99b of the IFS and the·Bank Al-Sudan reports.
The data on eF, the domestic currency denominated privately held stock of
foreign money is proxied by the estimate of income circulating in the black
market, see text and footnote (11) for more details.
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A.4

Monetary Variables
This includes money, domestic credit, and official reserves.

all of the above variables is obtained from IFS.

The data on

The definition of money

taken in the study is the narrow one (Ml).

A.5

Terms of Trade
The data on TOT is obtained from The World Bank (1982, 1985) and the last

three years were estimated using data on developing countries TOT taken from
IFS.

I,
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Notes

1.

Strictly speaking most of the above cited literature did not solve
explicitly for exports, employment, or output, as functions of real
exchange rate; -the structure developed, however, can easily be adapted to
do that.

2.

In case~ where substantial foreign exchange is channeled through the

black market, the authorities may attempt to utilize those resources by
initiating an import system, for example, where the use of the black
.market foreign exchange by importers to finance such imports though
illegal in theory but nevertheless a common practice.

For a discussion

of the case of the Sudan on this issue see Umbadda (1984, 1986).

3.

Examples of the literature in the black market for foreign exchange
include:

Blejer (1978), Culbertson (1975), Levy (1983), Dornbusch et.

al. (1983), de Macedo (1983), Ali and Hussain (1986), Elbadawi (1988a),
and Elbadawi and Hussain (1988).

4.

See Footnote (2) above.

5.

Edwards (1987) provides an interesting discussion on several real
exchange rate definitions.

6.

This assumption is j-ust:ified on the account that productive capacity in
LDCs tend to change over a much longer horizon than do relative prices
and other demand variables.
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7.

In Edwards (1985, 1986b), f(·) is set equal to (~t-~~).

This measure of

excess aggregate demand recognize s the foreign reserves channel as a
source of monetary disequilib rium in addition to domestic credit.

The

environme nt of interest to us in this paper, however, is one where
monetary disequilib rium is dominated by move~ents in domestic credit.

8.

See Pesaran (1987), for a useful and comprehen sive discussio n of rational
expectati on models such as the one in equation (17).

9.

Currently these remittanc e flows are estimated at $3 billion annually,
which is almost three times the foreign exchange earnings out of exports.

10.

Unofficia l, and possibly more reliable, estimates of inflation in the
Sudan put the figure at a range of 50 to 60 percent.

11.

Income circulati ng in the black market was estimated in Hussain and
Elbadawi (1988) by using the identity MV = Y where Mis money supply, V
is the velocity of money, and Y is nominal income.

The unreporte d black

is then obtained as Yu = MV - Y, where Vis an
market income, Y,
u
estimate of V.

12.

Engle and Granger (1987) shows that co-integr ating time series are
consisten t with error correctio n represent ation.

Engle and Granger

(1987) also developed some tests for co-integr ating series .. One such
test, which was used here in this paper, is based on running a regressio n
of an equilibriu m error-cor rection equation such as (9), (10), (12),
(13), and (16) and testing a null hypothesi s of the Durbin Watson
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statistics equal to zero.

A

rejection of this hypothesis means that the

series are co-integrating, hence error-correctio n is consistent with the
data generating process.

13.

Equation (13), however, was estimated directly since this provides better
results than its corresponding error-correctio n counterpart both in terms
of overall fit and other diagnostic properties.

14.

Domowitz and Hakkio (1987), however, showed extimating equations such as
the ones in (9') - (12') and (16'), are consistent with the following
intertemporal error-correctio n loss function:
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provided that RER* (the equilibrium RER) follows any process more
complicated than a random walk.

other examples in the literature also
~

includes Hendry (1980a, 1980b); Hendry, Pagan, and Sargan (1984), Nickell
(1985), and Hendry and van Ungern-Sternbe rg(l981), to men.tion a few.

15.

Equation (21") is obtained from (21') by utilizing the following
relations:
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See Section (3.1).
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See also Umbadda (1984, 1986) for more details on
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